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strategic trades. The moral hazard problem stemming from spot market power thus provides a 
venue for strategic trading and manipulation that parallels the adverse selection problem 
stemming from inside information. 
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When a spot market monopolist has a position in a corresponding futures market, he has an incentive to
deviate from the spot market optimum to make this position more proﬁtable. Rational futures market
makers take this into account when setting prices. We show that the monopolist, by randomizing his
futures market position, can strategically exploit his market power at the expense of other futures market
participants. Furthermore, traders without market power can manipulate futures prices by hiding their
orders behind the monopolist’s strategic trades. The moral hazard problem stemming from spot market
power thus provides a venue for strategic trading and manipulation that parallels the adverse selection
problem stemming from inside information.
JEL Classiﬁcation D82, G13
Keywords strategic trading, manipulation, spot market power1I n t r o d u c t i o n
For many goods, spot markets with market power coexist with competitive futures markets. When a spot
market monopolist participates in a futures market, this participation leads to a moral hazard problem in
the spot market. In particular, he has an incentive to deviate from the monopoly optimum in order to
make his futures market position more proﬁtable. For example, if a monopolist producer of oil holds a short
position in an oil futures contract, he will proﬁt if the price of oil goes down. This gives him an incentive
to produce more oil than he otherwise might in order to reduce spot market prices and make his futures
position more proﬁtable. When rational futures market participants observe the monopolist’s position, they
will take the impact of this position on subsequent spot prices into account when setting futures prices.
When they cannot observe the monopolist’s position perfectly they must make rational inferences about the
monopolist’s position and take these into account when setting prices.1
In this paper, we explore strategic trading and manipulation in futures markets when market positions
cannot be inferred perfectly. Spot market power allows the monopolist to trade strategically — randomly
taking a position in the futures market and then moving spot prices to make that position proﬁtable. This
creates an opportunity for those without market power to engage in futures market manipulation — taking a
position in a derivatives market and then mimicking the monopolist’s futures trading to move futures market
prices to make the derivatives position proﬁtable. The literature on market microstructure deals extensively
with the eﬀects of asymmetric information when the positions of informed traders cannot be observed
perfectly. This paper argues that the moral hazard problem created by spot market power parallels the
adverse selection problem created by inside information.
In Section 2, we show how the monopolist can exploit his market power to trade strategically. When
he is able to hide his futures market position within the aggregate order ﬂow, he will randomize his orders
and then set spot prices to make his futures market position more proﬁtable. This makes hedging more
expensive for those who may be the monopolist’s counterparty. Spot market power thus discourages futures
1This paper takes Anderson’s (1990) advice. He surveys the literature on futures trading with perfect inference when the
underlying market is imperfectly competitive and suggests in his conclusion:
“The theoretical development that would be most interesting would be to reconsider some of these models described
above under conditions of asymmetric information. In particular, the models reviewed have made the assumption
(at least implicitly) that the futures positions of powerful agents are observed so that forecasts of future cash
prices can take this into account. In practice, futures positions of agents are likely to be imperfectly observable.”
(p. 246-247)
1market participation for agents without market power and provides a venue for a spot market monopolist
to increase expected proﬁts by trading strategically.2
This section shows that results similar to those in Kyle’s (1985) “noise trader” model are obtained when
there is spot market power instead of inside information. In our model, there are no informed traders with
private information about future prices at the time trading takes place. Instead, the monopolist can set
spot market prices after trading takes place. In contrast to the “noise traders” in the Kyle model who act
mechanically, in our model agents without market power respond optimally to the monopolist’s presence in
the futures market by reducing their futures market participation (see Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992)
for the analogous extension of the Kyle model). Pirrong (1995, 2001) shows that a trader who can buy or
sell an arbitrarily large number of futures contracts is able to inﬂuence the price at liquidation by demanding
or selling too many units of the commodity in the delivery market. He can proﬁt in equilibrium from the
artiﬁcially high or low spot market price if he randomizes his order ﬂow to hide behind the order ﬂow of
“noise traders” and if the supply curve in the delivery market is upward sloping. While the randomized
strategy in Pirrong parallels the one of the monopolist in this paper, we explicitly model decisions in the
spot market, endogenize the initial futures position of the strategic agent and the response of hedgers.
In Section 3, we extend Section 2 by showing how traders can move (i.e. “manipulate”) futures prices even
when they do not have market power. If a futures market manipulator takes a position in the derivatives
market, he has an incentive to move subsequent prices to make his initial position proﬁtable. He will be
able to move prices if market participants believe that his subsequent trades may have been submitted by
the monopolist. While these trades are unproﬁtable, their cost is outweighed by the beneﬁt of moving prices
to make the initial position more proﬁtable.
Past research has shown that markets can be manipulated if some agents have private information about
prices (see e.g. Hart (1977), Jarrow (1992), Allen and Gale (1992), Kumar and Seppi (1992)). For example,
Kumar and Seppi, develop a model in which uninformed manipulators are able to proﬁti nt h ef u t u r e sm a r k e t
because spot market makers are unable to diﬀerentiate the manipulator’s order ﬂow from the informed
trader’s order ﬂow. We show that monopoly power serves a similar function.
2Despite the importance of oil price risk faced by many industry sectors, the futures market on oil is relatively illiquid; in
particular, the trading volume of longer-term futures contract is very low. Our paper suggests that this may stem from the
imperfectly competitive nature of the spot market for oil.
22 Strategic Trading by Spot Market Monopolists
In this section, we show how spot market monopolists can exploit their market power by trading strategically
in the futures market. This trade discourages futures market participation since traders fear that the
monopolist may be their counterparty or the counterparty of another trader with a similar position. The
monopolist will exert spot market power to make his futures position more proﬁtable, thereby reducing the
proﬁts of his counterparties.3
This section builds on the work of Kyle (1985), who shows that agents with inside information can prof-
itably exploit their informational advantage by hiding behind the order ﬂow of uninformed “noise traders”.
In our model, the aggregate hedging demand of agents without market power is stochastic just as the number
of “noise traders” is stochastic in the Kyle model.
The monopolist can increase his proﬁts because, when setting futures market prices, market makers
cannot fully take into account take the impact of the monopolist’s unobserved futures market position on
expected spot prices. While the monopolist’s expected spot market proﬁt is reduced by deviating from the
monopoly optimum, his expected proﬁt in the futures market more than makes up for it. Since market
makers earn zero expected proﬁts, the monopolist’s expected futures market proﬁts imply expected futures
market losses for other market participants. This increased cost deters these agents from hedging price risk
as much as they otherwise might. While we consider only the case of monopoly — when there is exactly
one agent with spot market power — to obtain greater analytic tractability, similar logic will apply in an
oligopolistic setting.
2.1 Model Setup
We envision a model with one good and two periods, t =1 ,2. The good is produced only in the second
period and sold in the spot market. The cost of production is normalized to zero. Demand is uncertain
and realizes in between the two periods. In addition, there is a competitive futures market.
There are three types of agents in this market. First, there is a spot market monopolist. The monopolist
3Storage may reduce the ability of the monopolist to trade strategically. When storage is inexpensive, agents without market
power may purchase and store the good in anticipation of higher prices in the future. This limits the ability of the monopolist to
raise prices, as excess capacity will prevent prices from increasing. In this sense, storage serves the same function as durability
in the durable-goods monopoly problem of Coase (1972). Like durability, storage erodes market power by providing a venue
for the monopolist to compete against his future self. Here, we assume that storage costs are high enough that no storage takes
place in equilibrium, so that monopoly power is not eroded.
3sets the spot price (and therefore quantity) to maximize expected proﬁt s . W ea s s u m et h a tt h em o n o p o l i s ti s
risk-neutral, so that he has no incentive to participate in the futures market unless he can increase expected
proﬁts by doing so. Second, there are competitive risk-neutral market makers who observe the aggregate
order ﬂow and set futures prices accordingly. Third, there are risk-averse agents whose payoﬀ depends on
the price realized in the spot market. They have an incentive to participate in the futures market because
doing so allows them to hedge spot price risk. We assume that the number of these agents is stochastic and
unobservable.
The timing of events is as follows. First, nature chooses a number of risk-averse agents. Then in
t =1 , the monopolist and the risk-averse agents simultaneously submit futures market orders. Observing
the aggregate order ﬂow, the sum of these orders, market makers set futures prices equal to expected spot
prices. Next, demand is realized and in t =2 , the monopolist chooses spot market quantity to maximize
proﬁts. Figure 1 provides a timeline.
t = 1
Futures market
Hedgers
Monopolist
Monopolist sets prices Demand realizes
t = 2
Spot market
Futures market settles
Figure 1
We make the following assumptions:
• The demand curve is linear, so that spot prices are given by P = a − bQ,w h e r ea is stochastic and
b>0.4
• All risk-averse agents are identical and the number of such agents, N, is stochastic and uniformly
distributed on [0,1].
• Each risk-averse agent has proﬁts that are linear in the spot market price, i.e. πn (P)=c0 +c1P,w i t h
4The choice of a linear demand function is for analytic tractability. While a much broader class of functions will obtain
similar results, not all demand functions will obtain the same results. In particular, convex demand curves will provide an
even stronger incentive for the monopolist to strategically trade in the futures market as large changes in the spot price lead to
relatively small changes in monopoly proﬁts. Concave demand curves provide a weaker incentive for strategic trading.
4c1 < 0, so that higher spot prices imply lower proﬁts.5
• Any risk-averse agent is too small to aﬀect aggregate order ﬂow and thus takes prices as given.
In the initial period, the monopolist can enter into a futures contract with payoﬀ P − k per contract,
where k is the futures price. The monopolist chooses a number of contracts Cm.G i v e n Cm and realization
of demand, a, the monopolist sets spot market price and quantity to maximize proﬁts
π = Cm (P − k)+PQ
= Cm (a − bQ − k)+( a − bQ)Q.( 1 )
T h es p o tm a r k e tF O Ci s
∂π
∂Q
= −bCm + a − 2bQ =0 .
Note that the SOC is satisﬁed, yielding an optimal quantity and price
Q∗ =
1
2b
(a − bCm);( 2 )
P∗ =
1
2
(a + bCm).
Each risk-averse agent chooses a number of contracts Cn. This number will be determined optimally
based on their preferences. The total number of contracts submitted by these agents, NCn, is stochastic.
Market makers only observe the aggregate order ﬂow, NCn + Cm. They have beliefs about the order ﬂow
submitted by the monopolist and the risk-averse agents and set the futures price, k,a c c o r d i n g l y .
2.2 Equilibrium with Strategic Trading
In this setup, we look for perfect Bayesian equilibria in the futures market given optimal subsequent behavior
in the spot market. We assume a set of actions and beliefs for all agents and explore whether any agent has
an incentive to deviate. This section explores equilibria in which the monopolist hides his futures market
participation by randomizing the order ﬂow he submits. When the monopolist submits a positive (negative)
5The linear functional form is used for tractability. Any proﬁt function that provides hedging motives will yield similar
results. In particular, an upward sloping proﬁt function, c1 > 0, would imply risk-averse agents taking a short instead of a
long position, but to a lesser extend than they would in the absence of strategic trading by the spot market monopolist.
5order ﬂow — with plans to drive up (down) spot prices to make this position proﬁtable — market makers are
unsure about the order submitted by the monopolist. This imperfect inference allows the monopolist to
receive favorable futures market prices, at the expense of other agents in the market.
In this setting, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium consists of
1. beliefs held by market makers about Cn and the distribution of ˜ Cm, and a price schedule, k(.) for
which market makers earn zero expected proﬁts,
2. beliefs held by the monopolist about k(.) and Cn, and a set of possible values for Cm where each yields
the same expected proﬁt given those beliefs, and no other values for Cm yield higher expected proﬁts,
3. beliefs held by the risk-averse agents about k(.) and the distribution of ˜ Cm, and a value of Cn that
maximizes expected utility given those beliefs, and
4. oﬀ—path beliefs held by market makers about the monopolist’s order ﬂow when the observed aggregate
order ﬂow is inconsistent with their beliefs — given prices set competitively based on these beliefs, the
monopolist will not choose to submit an oﬀ—path order ﬂow quantity.
The beliefs of all agents must be consistent with one another, and with the actions of other agents.
2.2.1 Beliefs and Prices of Market Makers
There are many sets of beliefs that market maker could hold about the monopolist’s futures market partic-
ipation that imply that the monopolist’s order ﬂow cannot be perfectly inferred from the aggregate order
ﬂow. Here, we look for an involving the simplest set of such beliefs. Suppose market makers believe that
each risk-averse agent submits an order Cn and that the monopolist randomizes between +x and −x with
equal probability where 0 ≤ x<1
2Cn. Based on their beliefs, they set actuarially fair prices. Oﬀ—path, we
assume that market makers set prices based on the most punitive beliefs.
The aggregate order ﬂow, θ ≡ Cm+CnN, can indicate that the monopolist has successfully hidden, that
he has been caught for sure with having submitted +x or −x given market maker beliefs, or that aggregate
order ﬂow is inconsistent with market makers’ beliefs. We categorize the aggregate order ﬂow into the
6following ﬁve groups and specify the price schedules for all possible values of θ.6
A1.k (θ)=
1
2
E [a]+
1
2
bθ if θ>x+ Cn (3)
A2.k (θ)=
1
2
E [a]+
1
2
bx if − x + Cn <θ≤ x + Cn
A3.k (θ)=
1
2
E [a] if x ≤ θ ≤− x + Cn
A4.k (θ)=
1
2
E [a] −
1
2
bx if − x ≤ θ<x
A5.k (θ)=
1
2
E [a]+
1
2
b(θ − Cn) if θ<−x
In ranges A1 and A5, market makers know that the monopolist submitted an order ﬂow inconsistent
with market makers’ expectations. In range A1,i tm u s th a v eb e e nt h ec a s et h a tCm >x ,a n dt h e ya s s u m e
that N =0 . In range A5, it must have been the case that Cm < −x, and they assume N =1 . Prices
are set accordingly. In ranges A2 and A4, market makers believe that the monopolist submitted +x and
−x, respectively. Prices are set accordingly. In range A3, the monopolist hides successfully within the
aggregate order ﬂow. In this region, market makers believe that −x and +x are equally likely.
Prices are set competitively. In other words, if the monopolist and risk-averse agents take actions that
conform to the beliefs of market makers, then no market maker will have an incentive to deviate. Note that
the market makers’ behavior takes as given the order ﬂow of each risk-averse agent, Cn. Next, we examine
optimal behavior on the part of the monopolist given the beliefs and price schedule of market makers.
2.2.2 Beliefs and Actions of Monopolist
The monopolist takes as given the order ﬂow of risk-averse agents, Cn,a sw e l la st h ef u t u r e sp r i c es c h e d u l e ,
k(·), set by market makers given the aggregate order ﬂow. Since the monopolist is risk-neutral and market
makers are rational, the monopolist will not participate in the futures market in any equilibrium in which
6If x =0 , prices are set as:
A1.k (θ)=
1
2
E [a]+
1
2
b(θ) if θ>C n
A3.k (θ)=
1
2
E [a] if 0 ≤ θ ≤ Cn
A5.k (θ)=
1
2
E [a]+
1
2
b(θ − Cn) if θ<0
7he does not try to disguise his order ﬂow. When he does not participate, his expected proﬁts are
E [π|Cm =0 ]=
1
4b
E
£
a2¤
.
On the other hand, if the monopolist ﬁnds it optimal to randomize in a way consistent with market makers’
beliefs, he must earn the same expected proﬁts whether he submits an order ﬂow +x or −x.O t h e r w i s e ,
he would only play one of the strategies and his actions would be incompatible with market makers’ beliefs.
Given the futures price schedule, k(.),w en o wﬁnd the optimal behavior on the part of the monopolist.
Proposition 1 Given that market makers set k(.) as in (3), the monopolist will maximize expected proﬁts
by submitting either Cm =+ x or −x,w h e r e0 ≤ x<1
4Cn. The monopolist’s expected proﬁts will be
E [π|x]=E [π| − x]=
1
4b
E
£
a2¤
+ bx2
µ
1
4
−
x
Cn
¶
>E [π|Cm =0 ] for x>0.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
When market makers set k(.) consistent with the belief that the monopolist randomizes between +x,
and −x, the monopolist will ﬁnd it optimal to act consistently with those beliefs. Note that there are many
possible equilibria, one for each x. In an equilibrium in which x =0 , the monopolist does not participate in
the futures market. For larger x, the monopolist proﬁts in the futures market at the expense of risk-averse
agents.
2.2.3 Beliefs and Actions of Risk-Averse Agents
The risk-averse agents know that it is optimal for the monopolist to hide his futures position within the
aggregate order ﬂow by randomizing Cm and then set spot market prices optimally given this futures
position. Their preferences are represented by a concave utility function, u. To reduce their exposure
to spot market price risk, a given risk-averse agent will participate in the futures market by purchasing C
units of the futures contract. Cn is the number of contracts purchased by the average risk-averse agent in
8the market and is set optimally by each agent according to the following optimization problem:
Cn∗ =a r g m a x
C
E [u(C (P∗ − k)+c0 + c1P∗)] (4)
=a r g m a x
C
E
·
u
µ
C
µ
1
2
(a + bCm) − k
¶
+ c0 + c1
µ
1
2
(a + bCm)
¶¶¸
where k(.) is set consistent with (3). As before, risk-averse agents believe that Cm can take on two values,
+x and −x, with equal probability. We have shown above that for a given Cn there exist equilibria with
0 ≤ x<1
4Cn.
When a risk-averse agent wants to hedge, this provides him with information that the expected aggregate
hedging demand is high. He then acts rationally taking this information into account. Since risk-averse
agents are identical, none is more or less likely to hedge than any other. Therefore, the distribution of the
number of hedgers, conditional on a given agent wanting to hedge, is f (N)=2 N.7
First, we examine optimal hedging in the absence of the monopolist, i.e. if x =0 .I n t h i s c a s e ,
Cn∗ =a r gm a x
C
E
·
u
µ
C
µ
1
2
a −
1
2
E [a]
¶
+ c0 + c1
1
2
a
¶¸
.
The FOC is then
E
·µ
1
2
a −
1
2
E [a]
¶
u0
µ
C
µ
1
2
a −
1
2
E [a]
¶
+ c0 + c1
1
2
a
¶¸
=0 .
Note that the SOC is satisﬁed. For Cn∗ = −c1,t h eF O Ci ss a t i s ﬁed and it is a global maximum. Without
the monopolist’s participation in the futures market, it is optimal for risk-averse agents to eliminate all risk.
We now examine optimal hedging when the monopolist participates in the futures market, i.e. when x>0.
Proposition 2 In an equilibrium in which the monopolist participates in the futures market with order ﬂow
+x and −x with equal probability where 0 <x<1
4Cn, risk-averse agents maximizing (4) will participate
in the futures market, though will participate less than they would if the monopolist did not participate, i.e.
0 <C n∗ < −c1.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
7Similarly, agents without hedging needs would update their beliefs about the expected number of hedgers accordingly.
These agents will participate in the futures market to exploit their information. This will mitigate but not eliminate the eﬀect
we discuss. If all agents do not take into account the information contained in their own hedging demand, these agents will
not believe that they face unfavorable prices on average, and will not reduce their hedging demand. However, their expected
proﬁts will be lower if they hold these naïve beliefs.
9If risk-averse agents believe that the monopolist trades strategically in the futures market, they are
concerned that the monopolist will hold an opposite position and move spot prices against them. A given
risk-averse agent knows that he is more likely to want to hedge precisely at the wrong times as he is more
likely to hedge when aggregate order ﬂow from risk-averse agents is large. In this case, either the monopolist
also submits a large order ﬂow and is spotted — in which case futures prices are set fairly — or the monopolist
submits a small order ﬂow and hides successfully — in which case the monopolist gains at the risk-averse
agents’ expense. This makes hedging more expensive for agents without market power and thus discourages
their participation in the futures market.
The following proposition shows that a perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists with the beliefs and actions
as speciﬁed above.
Proposition 3 Given the market structure described in Subsection 2.1, there exists a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium in which futures market prices are set as in (3), risk-averse agents each submit an order of Cn,w h e r e
0 <C n < −c1, and the monopolist submits an order ﬂow of either +x or −x with equal probability, where
0 <x<1
4Cn.
Proof. Proposition 1 shows that the monopolist has no incentive to deviate from this equilibrium. Proposi-
tion 2 shows that risk-averse agents have no incentive to deviate from this equilibrium. Market makers earn
zero proﬁts and none has an incentive to oﬀer another price schedule.
Here, a spot market monopolist is able to increase proﬁts by trading strategically in the futures market.
The monopolist takes a futures market position randomly, then deviates from the spot market monopoly
optimum to move spot market prices and make this position more proﬁtable. If the monopolists futures
market position were perfectly observable, market makers would set futures market prices anticipating these
actions. In this case, the monopolist would not want to participate in the futures market since doing so
would decrease expected spot market proﬁts without increasing expected futures market proﬁts. However,
when there are other traders in the market, the futures market position submitted by the monopolist cannot
be perfectly inferred by observing the aggregate order ﬂow. In this case, market makers set prices based
on the rational belief that the orders they receive could have come from either the monopolist or from other
agents without market power. As a result, trades submitted by the monopolist move prices less than they
would had they been observable. Just as an informed trader in the Kyle model proﬁts at the expense of
“noise traders”, the monopolist earns positive expected proﬁts in the futures market at the expense of the
10other market participants. This makes futures market participation expensive, and reduces the optimal
participation of risk-averse agents.
3 Futures Market Manipulation under Spot Market Power
The last section showed that a spot market monopolist can proﬁtably exploit spot market power in the
futures market. This section documents that even those without market power can proﬁti nt h ef u t u r e s
market when another agent has spot market power. This section relies on the insight of Kumar and Seppi
(1992), that agents without inside information can manipulate a market if they are mistaken for agents with
inside information. Here, we show that the same can be said of market power: agents without market power
who hold futures market positions can use later trading to manipulate prices to make the original position
proﬁtable when market makers believe they might be the monopolist.
3.1 Model Setup with Manipulators
3.1.1 Timing and Markets
While the model developed Section 2 has markets in only two periods, the model in this section requires
trade in three periods. t =1 ,2 mirror our earlier setup; here, we add an initial period, t =0 ,i nw h i c h
agents trade contracts whose payoﬀs are contingent on futures prices in the next period. Presenting the
markets in reverse chronological order:
t =2: There is a spot market at time t =2 . As before, production in this period is controlled by a monopolist,
who faces a linear demand curve, i.e. spot prices are given by P = a − bQ,w h e r ea, b>0.8 The cost
of production is zero.
t =1: T h e r ei saf u t u r e sm a r k e ta tt i m et =1 , characterized by linear cash-settled contracts based on the
spot price in the next period, with payoﬀ P − k1 per contract.
8While the assumption of linear demand is critical to obtain simple analytic results, the same intuition obtains with a convex
demand curve. While losing analytic tractability, these demand functions have the advantage that the monopolist has a strict
beneﬁt from participating in the futures market. When demand is linear, the increased proﬁts in the futures market that come
with futures market participation are exactly oﬀset by lower spot market monopoly proﬁts.
11t =0: T h e r ei saf u t u r e sm a r k e ta tt i m et =0 , characterized by linear cash-settled contracts based on the
futures strike price in the next period, with payoﬀ k1 − k0 per contract.9
3.1.2 Actors
The model involves four types of actors:
1. Noise traders submit a stochastic order ﬂow, Cn
0 ,a tt =0and they do not participate at t =1 .W e
assume that Cn
0 is uniformly distributed on [Cn−,Cn+]. The assumption that noise traders participate
only in the initial period is for expositional simplicity and is not necessary to obtain these results.10
2. Monopolist submits an order ﬂow, Cm
1 ,a tt =1 , and then sets prices and quantities optimally at t =2 .
To simplify the problem, the monopolist is assumed not to participate in the futures market at t =0 .
3. Manipulator (denoted by the letter h to refer to “hiders”) submits an order ﬂow, Ch
0,a tt =0 ,a n d
Ch
1,a tt =1 . We impose the following liquidity constraint
¯ ¯Ch
0
¯ ¯ ≤ W<1
2 (Cn+ − Cn−).11
4. Market makers, as before, are risk-neutral and act competitively to set strike prices k0 and k1.M a r k e t
makers observe aggregate order ﬂow θ1 ≡ Cm
1 + Ch
1 at t =1and θ0 ≡ Ch
0 + Cn
0 at t =0 ,a n d
make rational inferences about the positions of various agents and their impact on contract payoﬀs.
Therefore, k1 = E [P∗|θ1] and k0 = E [k1|θ0].
9Note that a futures contract whose payoﬀ is based on the price of another futures contract is unusual. However, there
are many options whose payoﬀ is based on a futures contract. While we use a linear futures contract and not an options
contract at t =0for analytical tractability, our result that manipulative trading exists in equilibrium is robust to changes in
the contractual structure. Furthermore, many futures markets based on the spot price of a storable commodity are eﬀectively
a future on a future, as storability links current spot and forward prices.
10For analytical tractability, we assume that these traders act mechanically, as “noise traders” do in the Kyle model. In-
troducing optimal behavior on their part as in Section 2 would not change our result that manipulative trading is possible in
equilibrium.
11Similar to Kumar and Seppi (1992), the manipulator will ﬁnd it optimal to take an unbounded position. We follow Kumar
and Seppi by imposing a wealth constraint to obtain an equilibrium.
12Figure 2 provides a timeline showing which agents participate in each market.
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Figure 2
The monopolist is willing to participate in the futures market for the same strategic reason outlined in
Section 2. He earns proﬁts by setting spot market prices to make his futures market position proﬁtable.
While the monopolist’s spot market proﬁta tt =2is lower than it would be had he not participated in the
futures market, futures market proﬁts in t =1are high enough (at least weakly) to oﬀset these reduced
proﬁts.
The manipulator is willing to accept expected losses in the futures market at t =1for the same reason
that the monopolist is willing to accept lower expected proﬁt si nt h es p o tm a r k e ta tt =2 . Just as the
monopolist sets spot prices at t =2to make his futures market position at t =1proﬁtable, the manipulator
trades in the futures market at t =1in order to move futures prices, thereby making his futures market
position at t =0proﬁtable. Just as the monopolist earns expected proﬁts at the expense of the manipulator
at t =1 , the manipulator earns expected proﬁts at the expense of noise traders at t =0 .
3 . 1 . 3 S p o tM a r k e tP r i c e s
For a given futures market position, the monopolist’s proﬁti sg i v e nb y( 1 )s ot h a tp r i c e sa n dq u a n t i t i e sa r e
set optimally according to (2). Optimal proﬁtw i l lt h e nb e
π = −Cm
1 k1 +
1
4b
(a + bCm
1 )
2 .
As in Section 2, futures market participation causes the monopolist to deviate from the spot market monopoly
optimum. He moves prices to make the futures market position proﬁtable.
133.2 Equilibrium with Manipulation
Here, we propose a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with manipulation:
t =0: The manipulator randomizes between +x and −x with equal probability where
x =m i n
µ
W,
2
3
¡
Cn+ − Cn− − W
¢¶
.
Market makers set
k0 =
1
2
a
regardless of the aggregate order ﬂow submitted.
t =1: There are three possible subgames (denoted SG1, SG2, and SG3) depending on the aggregate order
ﬂow, θ0 = Ch
0 + Cn
0 ,a tt =0 :
SG1. If θ0 >C n+ − x then market makers know that the manipulator must have submitted Ch
0 =+ x.
In this case, the monopolist will not participate in the futures market, i.e. Cm
1 =0 .T h e
manipulator submits the same order as in the previous period, i.e. Ch
1 = Ch
0, and market makers
set the futures price as
k1 = E [P∗|θ1]=
1
2
a +
1
2
b(θ1 − x).
SG2. If Cn− + x ≤ θ0 ≤ Cn+ − x then the manipulator has successfully hidden his order ﬂow in the
previous period. The monopolist randomizes over Cm
1 ∈
©
−1
2x, 1
2x
ª
with equal probability, and
the manipulator sets Ch
1 = 1
2Ch
0. Market makers set the futures price as
k1 = E [P∗|θ1]=
1
2
a +
1
4
bθ1.
SG3. If θ0 <C n− + x then market makers know that the manipulator must have submitted Ch
0 = −x.
The monopolist will not participate, i.e. Cm
1 =0 , and the manipulator submits the same order
as in the previous period, i.e. Ch
1 = Ch
0. The futures price is then set as
k1 = E [P∗|θ1]=
1
2
a +
1
2
b(θ1 + x).
14t =2: The monopolist sets prices and quantities according to (2).
Proposition 4 The actions and beliefs described above constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Financial market manipulation is possible when agents without market power can be mistaken for those
with market power.
An agent without market power can proﬁt by taking a random position in the initial futures market at
t =0 . When this random position is not spotted as in SG2, he has an incentive to move subsequent futures
prices at t =1to make this initial position more proﬁtable. For example, if he takes a long position in the
initial futures market, this position becomes proﬁtable if subsequent futures market prices are high. As a
result, he has an incentive to take a long position in the subsequent futures market to drive up prices. When
market makers observe this long position, they believe it could have been submitted by the monopolist, who
would then use his monopoly power to raise spot prices. Therefore, market makers rationally set higher
futures prices in response to the long aggregate order ﬂow they observe. Since the manipulator’s trade at
t =1moves prices without altering the underlying contract payoﬀ, this trade is unproﬁtable. By taking
a larger position in the initial futures market than in the subsequent one, the proﬁts he earns in the initial
futures market by moving subsequent prices exceed his losses from subsequent trading.
When the manipulator’s position is identiﬁed (SG1 and SG3), his subsequent trades can be inferred
perfectly and he earns no proﬁt.
In Section 2, a monopolist’s trades could not be diﬀerentiated from those submitted by risk-averse agents.
He was able to proﬁt because the futures market trades he submitted moved prices by less than they would
have had they been observable. In this section, a manipulator’s trades cannot be diﬀerentiated from those
of the monopolist. The manipulator is able to proﬁt because the futures market trades he submits move
prices by more than they would have had they been observable. As in Section 2, the monopolist proﬁts
from the manipulator’s presence at t =1since this causes the trades he submits to move prices by less than
they would otherwise.
154C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we have shown how monopoly power impacts futures market behavior when futures market
participation is not observable. Spot market monopolists will trade in the futures market — trying to
hide behind the trades of agents without market power — and then strategically set spot prices to make
their futures positions more proﬁtable. This makes hedging expensive, and therefore reduces futures market
participation for agents without market power. Agents without market power may manipulate futures prices
by hiding behind the trades of the monopolist to make their earlier futures market positions proﬁtable. As
i nt h ec a s eo fm o d e l sw i t ha ni n f o r m e dt r a d e ri n s t e a dof a monopolist, we have shown that both strategic
and manipulative trading can exist in equilibrium.
Many existing futures markets with imperfectly competitive underlying spot markets exhibit very low
levels of participation relative to their importance. In particular, markets for longer term contracts tend
to be illiquid. For example, the trading activity in futures markets for oil is relatively low. Our paper
suggests an explanation based on the imperfectly competitive nature of the oil spot market. Given the moral
hazard problems discussed in this paper, several markets — including weather derivatives — have emerged
to avoid the ineﬃciencies caused by market power. Weather derivatives provide an index-hedge against
extreme temperatures, and therefore against oil demand risk. Despite large basis risk, these contracts are
not susceptible to moral hazard.
16AA p p e n d i x : P r o o f s
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In this case, when submitting Cm,t h e r ea r e7 ranges the monopolists order ﬂow, Cm, could be in. These
are categorized according to which possible prices, A1−A5, the monopolist could face, depending upon the
realization of N:
M1 Cm >x+ Cn always A1 “caught up oﬀ-”
E [π|Cm]=−CmE [k|Cm]+
1
4b
E
h
(a + bCm)
2
i
E [π|Cm]=−Cm
Z 1
0
µ
1
2
E [a]+
1
2
b(Cm + CnN)
¶
dN +
1
4b
E
h
(a + bCm)
2i
=
1
4b
E
£
a2¤
−
1
2
bCm
µ
1
2
Cm +
1
2
Cn
¶
<E [π|0] =
1
4b
E
£
a2¤
if Cn > −Cm
M2 −x + Cn <C m ≤ x + Cn either A1 “caught up oﬀ-” or A2 “caught up on-”
(a) A1 if Cn + x − Cm <C nN ≤ Cn
(b) A2 if 0 ≤ CnN ≤ Cn + x − Cm
E [π|Cm]=−CmE [k|Cm]+
1
4b
E
h
(a + bCm)
2
i
E [π|Cm]=−Cm1
2
E [a] − Cm
Z 1
1+
x−Cm
Cn
1
2
b(Cm + CnN)dN − Cm
Z 1+
x−Cm
Cn
0
1
2
bxdN +
1
4b
E
h
(a + bCm)
2
i
=
1
4b
E
£
a2¤
−
1
4
bCm
Ã
Cm +
(x − Cm)
2
Cn
!
<E [π|0] =
1
4b
E
£
a2¤
if Cm > 0
M3 x<C m ≤− x + Cn either A1 “caught up oﬀ-”, A2 “caught up on-”, or A3 “hidden”
(a) A1 if Cn + x − Cm <C nN ≤ Cn
(b) A2 if Cn − x − Cm ≤ CnN ≤ Cn + x − Cm
(c) A3 if 0 ≤ CnN ≤ Cn − x − Cm
17E [π|Cm]=−CmE [k|Cm]+
1
4b
E
h
(a + bCm)
2
i
E [π|Cm]=−Cm1
2
E [a] − Cm
Z 1
1+
x−Cm
Cn
1
2
b(Cm + CnN)dN − Cm
Z 1+
x−Cm
Cn
1−
x+Cm
Cn
1
2
bxdN +
1
4b
E
h
(a + bCm)
2
i
=
1
4b
E
£
a2¤
−
1
2
bCm
µ
1
2
Cm −
1
2
x2 − Cm2
Cn − x +2
x2
Cn
¶
dE [π|Cm]
dCm = −
1
2
b
µ
Cm − x +
3
2
x2
Cn +
3
2
Cm2
Cn
¶
d
dCmE [π|x<C m ≤− x + Cn] < 0 ∀ Cm >x
M4 −x ≤ Cm ≤ x either A2 “caught up on-”, A3 “hidden”, or A4 “caught down on-”
(a) A2 if Cn − x − Cm ≤ CnN ≤ Cn
(b) A3 if x − Cm ≤ CnN ≤ Cn − x − Cm
(c) A4 if 0 ≤ CnN<x− Cm
E [π|Cm]=−Cm1
2
E [a] − Cm
Z 1
1−
x+Cm
Cn
1
2
bxdN + Cm
Z x−Cm
Cn
0
1
2
bxdN +
1
4b
E
h
(a + bCm)
2i
=
1
4b
E
£
a2¤
+ bCm2
µ
1
4
−
1
Cnx
¶
For 0 <x<1
4Cn — as in the proposed – E [π|Cm] is maximized at Cm = x and Cm = −x.
M5 x − Cn ≤ Cm < −x either A3 “hidden”, A4 “caught down on-”, or A5 “caught down oﬀ-”
(a) A3 if x − Cm ≤ CnN ≤ Cn
(b) A4 if −x − Cm ≤ CnN<x− Cm
(c) A5 if 0 ≤ CnN<−x − Cm
By analogy to M3, d
dCmE [π|x − Cn ≤ Cm < −x] > 0
M6 −x − Cn ≤ Cm <x− Cn either A4 “caught down on-” or A5 “caught down oﬀ-”
(a) A4 if −x − Cm ≤ CnN<C n
(b) A5 if 0 ≤ CnN<0 − x − Cm
By analogy to M2, E [π| − x − Cn ≤ Cm <x− Cn] <E[π|0]
M7 Cm < −x − Cn always A5 “caught up oﬀ-”
By analogy to M1,E [π|Cm < −x − Cn] <E[π|0].
18Given the values of E [π|Cm] given above, E [π] is maximized for Cm = x and Cm = −x for 0 <x<1
4Cn,
so that
E [π|x]=E [π| − x]=
1
4b
E
£
a2¤
+
1
4
bx2 −
b
Cnx3 >E[π|0].
Therefore, the monopolist is indiﬀerent between submitting Cm = x and Cm = −x, and the market makers
can rationally believe that the monopolist randomizes between these two values with equal probability.
Given these beliefs, prices are set competitively and no market maker has an incentive to change k.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Risk-averse agents maximize the following objective function:
Cn∗ =a r g m a x
C
E [u(C (P∗ − k)+c0 + c1P∗)]
=a r g m a x
C
E
·
u
µ
C
µ
1
2
(a + bCm) − k
¶
+ c0 + c1
1
2
(a + bCm)
¶¸
where the risk averse agent takes as given the order ﬂow submitted by the average risk-averse agent, Cn,
and by the monopolist, Cm∗.T h e ﬁrst and second derivative of expected utility are given by
∂Eu
∂C
= E
·µ
1
2
(a + bCm) − k
¶
u0
µ
C
µ
1
2
(a + bCm) − k
¶
+ c0 + c1
1
2
(a + bCm)
¶¸
∂2Eu
∂C2 = E
"µ
1
2
(a + bCm) − k
¶2
u00
µ
C
µ
1
2
(a + bCm) − k
¶
+ c0 + c1
1
2
(a + bCm)
¶#
< 0.
Expected utility of risk averse agents is therefore a concave function in C.
∂Eu
∂C
=
· 1
2
R
E
£¡1
2 (a + bx) − k(x + NCn)
¢
u0 ¡
C
¡1
2 (a + bx) − k(x + NCn)
¢
+ c0 + c1
1
2 (a + bx)
¢¤
2NdN
+1
2
R
E
£¡1
2 (a − bx) − k(−x + NCn)
¢
u0 ¡
C
¡1
2 (a − bx) − k(−x + NCn)
¢
+ c0 + c1
1
2 (a − bx)
¢¤
2NdN
¸
=

   

1
2
³
1 −
¡
1 − 2x
Cn
¢2´
E
£¡1
2 (a + bx) − 1
2E [a] − 1
2bx
¢
u0 ¡
C
¡1
2 (a + bx) − 1
2E [a] − 1
2bx
¢
+ c0 + c1
1
2 (a + bx)
¢¤
+1
2
¡
1 − 2x
Cn
¢2 E
£¡1
2 (a + bx) − 1
2E [a]
¢
u0 ¡
C
¡1
2 (a + bx) − 1
2E [a]
¢
+ c0 + c1
1
2 (a + bx)
¢¤
+1
2
³
1 −
¡ 2x
Cn
¢2´
E
£¡1
2 (a − bx) − 1
2E [a]
¢
u0 ¡
C
¡1
2 (a − bx) − 1
2E [a]
¢
+ c0 + c1
1
2 (a − bx)
¢¤
+1
2
¡ 2x
Cn
¢2 E
£¡1
2 (a − bx) − 1
2E [a]+1
2bx
¢
u0 ¡
C
¡1
2 (a − bx) − 1
2E [a]+1
2bx
¢
+ c0 + c1
1
2 (a − bx)
¢¤

   

If we set x = λCn for 0 <λ<1
4 and C = Cn,w ec a nd e ﬁne the function g(.) such that
g(C) ≡
∂Eu
∂C
|Cn=C
=

   

1
2
³
1 − (1 − 2λ)
2
´
E
£¡1
2a − 1
2E [a]
¢
u0 ¡
C
¡1
2a − 1
2E [a]
¢
+ c0 + c1
1
2 (a + bλC)
¢¤
+1
2 (1 − 2λ)
2 E
£¡1
2 (a + bλC) − 1
2E [a]
¢
u0 ¡
C
¡1
2 (a + bλC) − 1
2E [a]
¢
+ c0 + c1
1
2 (a + bλC)
¢¤
+1
2
³
1 − (2λ)
2
´
E
£¡1
2 (a − bλC) − 1
2E [a]
¢
u0 ¡
C
¡1
2 (a − bλC) − 1
2E [a]
¢
+ c0 + c1
1
2 (a − bλC)
¢¤
+1
2 (2λ)
2 E
£¡1
2a − 1
2E [a]
¢
u0 ¡
C
¡1
2a − 1
2E [a]
¢
+ c0 + c1
1
2 (a − bλC)
¢¤

   

19First, we evaluate g(0)
g(0) = E
·µ
1
2
a −
1
2
E [a]
¶
u0
µ
c0 + c1
1
2
a
¶¸
Note that this expression is positive as c1 < 0. As a result, when other risk-averse agents do not hedge, any
given risk-averse agent can increase utility by hedging. Therefore, there is no in which no hedging occurs
unless c1 =0 , in which case the agents have no incentive to hedge. Next, we evaluate g(−c1).I n t h i s c a s e ,
we get
g(−c1)=2 λu0
µ
c1
1
2
E [a]+c0
¶
1
2
bλc1 (1 − 2λ)
< 0 for c1 < 0.
As expected, g(−c1) < 0.
This means that g switches signs between C =0and C = −c1.F u r t h e r m o r e , g is a smooth function.
Therefore, there must exist a C∗ between zero and −c1 such that g(C∗)=0 . As shown above, expected
utility is a concave function in the amount of hedging, C, which implies that the ﬁrst derivative of expected
utility, g, is decreasing in C.T h e s o l u t i o n C∗ to g(C∗)=0is therefore unique. Note that this implies
that in the proposed equilibria above there is some hedging by the risk averse agents but hedging is reduced
relative to the case of no monopolist participation in the market.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
We ﬁrst examine the optimal behavior given the beliefs about the manipulator’s behavior.
A.3.1 Monopolist
We showed that at t =2the monopolist maximizes his proﬁts by setting price and quantity as P∗ =
1
2 (a + bCm
1 ) and Q∗ = 1
2b (a − bCm
1 ).A t t =1 , the monopolist maximizes expected proﬁts given the price
schedule he faces and the beliefs he holds about the manipulator’s trading behavior. His objective function
at t =1depends on the aggregate order ﬂow θ0 = Ch
0 + Cn
0 at t =0 .
In SG1, if θ0 >C n+ − x, his expected proﬁts are
E [π]=E
·
−Cm
1
µ
1
2
a +
1
2
b
¡
Cm
1 + Ch
1 − x
¢¶
+
1
4b
(a + bCm
1 )
2
¸
.
The FOC is
∂E[π]
∂Cm
1
= E
·
−
1
2
b
¡
Ch
1 − x
¢
−
1
2
bCm
1
¸
.
Note that given θ0 >C n+−x and the beliefs about the manipulator’s trade at t =0we have Ch
1 = x,w h i c h
implies Cm
1 =0 . The SOC is
∂2E [π]
∂Cm2
1
= −
1
2
b<0.
In SG2, if Cn− + x ≤ θ0 ≤ Cn+ − x, his expected proﬁts are
E [π]=E
·
−Cm
1
µ
1
2
a +
1
4
b
¡
Cm
1 + Ch
1
¢¶
+
1
4b
(a + bCm
1 )
2
¸
20The FOC is
∂E[π]
∂Cm
1
= E
·
−
1
4
bCh
1
¸
.
Note that the monopolist believes that the manipulator will randomize between +1
2x and −1
2x with equal
probability, so that E
£
Ch
1
¤
=0 ,a n d
∂E[π]
∂Cm
1 =0 . Therefore, the monopolist is indiﬀerent between submitting
an order ﬂow and therefore willing to submit Cm
1 ∈
©
−1
2x, 1
2x
ª
with equal probability.12
In SG3, if θ0 <C n− + x, his expected proﬁts are
E [π]=E
·
−Cm
1
µ
1
2
a +
1
2
b
¡
Cm
1 + Ch
1 + x
¢¶
+
1
4b
(a + bCm
1 )
2
¸
In this case, the FOC is
∂E[π]
∂Cm
1
= E
·
−
1
2
b
¡
Ch
1 + x
¢
−
1
2
bCm
1
¸
.
Note that given θ0 <C n− + x and the beliefs about the manipulator’s trade at t =0we have Ch
1 = −x.
This implies
∂E[π]
∂Cm
1
= −
1
2
bCm
1 =0
which implies Cm
1 =0 . The SOC is
∂2E [π]
∂Cm2
1
= −
1
2
b<0.
We have thus shown that the monopolist has no incentive to deviate from the proposed given the price
schedule and his beliefs about the manipulator’s actions. Next, we examine the optimal behavior of the
manipulator.
A.3.2 Manipulator
At t =1the manipulator submits an order ﬂow to maximize his expected proﬁt sw h i c hd e p e n do nt h e
aggregate order ﬂow at t =0 . His expected proﬁts are
E
£
πh¤
= E
£
Ch
0 (k1 − k0)+Ch
1 (P − k1)
¤
.
In SG1, if θ0 >C n+ − x, his expected proﬁts are
E
£
πh¤
= E
£
Ch
0 (k1 − k0)+Ch
1 (P − k1)
¤
= E
·
1
2
b
¡
Ch
1 − x
¢¡
Ch
0 − Ch
1
¢¸
The FOC is
∂E
£
πh¤
∂Ch
1
= E
·
1
2
b
¡
Ch
0 − 2Ch
1
¢
+
1
2
bW
¸
=0
and the SOC is satisﬁed. This implies Ch
1 = 1
2
¡
x + Ch
0
¢
. Note that if the manipulator does randomize
between +x and −x at t =0 ,t h e nθ0 >C n+ −x is only true if Ch
0 = x.T h u s Ch
1 = x. His proﬁts are then
E
£
πh¤
=0 .
12Here the monopolist is indiﬀerent between participating and not participating in the futures market. This result is obtained
because we make the assumptions that there is no noise trading at t =1and demand is linear. If we either allow for noise
trading at t =1or a convex demand function the monopolist would have a strict incentive to strategically randomize at t =1 .
21In SG2, if Cn− + x ≤ θ0 ≤ Cn+ − x, his expected proﬁts are
E
£
πh¤
= E
£
Ch
0 (k1 − k0)+Ch
1 (P − k1)
¤
= E
·
1
4
bCh
0
¡
Cm
1 + Ch
1
¢
+
1
4
bCh
1
¡
Cm
1 − Ch
1
¢¸
.
The FOC is
∂E
£
πh¤
∂Ch
1
=
1
4
b
¡
Ch
0 + E [Cm
1 ] − 2Ch
1
¢
=0
and the SOC is satisﬁed. This implies Ch
1 = 1
2
¡
Ch
0 + E [Cm
1 ]
¢
. Note that if the manipulator believes that
the monopolist randomizes between +1
2x and −1
2x with equal probability at t =0 ,t h e nCh
1 = 1
2Ch
0.H i s
proﬁts are then
E
£
πh¤
=
1
16
bCh2
0 > 0
In SG3, if θ0 <C n− + x, his expected proﬁts are
E
£
πh¤
= E
£
Ch
0 (k1 − k0)+Ch
1 (P − k1)
¤
= E
·
1
2
b
¡
Ch
1 + x
¢¡
Ch
0 − Ch
1
¢¸
.
The FOC is
∂E
£
πh¤
∂Ch
1
= E
·
1
2
b
¡
Ch
0 − 2Ch
1
¢
−
1
2
bW
¸
=0
and the SOC is satisﬁed. This implies Ch
1 = 1
2
¡
−x + Ch
0
¢
. Again, if the manipulator randomizes between
+x and −x at t =0 ,t h e nθ0 <C n− + x is only true if Ch
0 = −x. Therefore, Ch
1 = −x and his proﬁts are
E
£
πh¤
=0 .
At t =0the manipulator submits an order ﬂow Ch
0 to maximize his expected proﬁts given optimal
behavior in subsequent periods. His expected proﬁts are given as
E
£
πh¤
= E
£
Ch
0 (k1 − k0)+Ch
1 (P − k1)
¤
.
If Ch
0 ≥ 0 then
E
£
πh¤
=


1
Cn+−Cn−
R Cn+
Cn+−x−Ch
0
¡
Ch
0 (k1 − k0)+Ch
1 (P − k1)
¢
dCn
0
+ 1
Cn+−Cn−
R Cn+−x−Ch
0
Cn−
¡
Ch
0 (k1 − k0)+Ch
1 (P − k1)
¢
dCn
0

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=
1
Cn+ − Cn−
1
16
bCh2
0
¡
Cn+ − x − Ch
0 − Cn−¢
.
The FOC is
∂E
£
πh¤
∂Ch
0
=
1
Cn+ − Cn−
1
16
bCh
0
¡
2
¡
Cn+ − Cn−¢
− 2x − 3Ch
0
¢
.
If the FOC is satisﬁed, then Ch
0 = 2
3 (Cn+ − Cn− − x). Recall the liquidity constraint,
¯ ¯Ch
0
¯ ¯ ≤ W<
1
2 (Cn+ − Cn−).I na ni n t e r i o r,x = Ch
0,s ot h a tCh
0 = 2
5 (Cn+ − Cn−).T h e S O C i s s a t i s ﬁed in this case.
Taking the liquidity constraint into account, it is optimal to set Ch
0 =m i n
¡
W, 2
5 (Cn+ − Cn−)
¢
.
22If Ch
0 < 0 then
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£
πh¤
=


1
Cn+−Cn−
R Cn+
Cn−+x−Ch
0
¡
Ch
0 (k1 − k0)+Ch
1 (P − k1)
¢
dCn
0
+ 1
Cn+−Cn−
R Cn−+x−Ch
0
Cn−
¡
Ch
0 (k1 − k0)+Ch
1 (P − k1)
¢
dCn
0


=
1
Cn+ − Cn−
1
16
bCh2
0
¡
Cn+ − Cn− − x + Ch
0
¢
.
The FOC is
∂E
£
πh¤
∂Ch
0
=
1
Cn+ − Cn−
1
16
bCh
0
¡
2
¡
Cn+ − Cn−¢
− 2x +3 Ch
0
¢
.
By logic parallel to the case where Ch
0 ≥ 0,i ti so p t i m a lt os e tCh
0 = −min
¡
W, 2
5 (Cn+ − Cn−)
¢
.
For an interior solution, expected proﬁts are
E
·
πh|Ch
0 = ±
2
5
¡
Cn+ − Cn−¢¸
=
1
100
b
¡
Cn+ − Cn−¢2 > 0;
for a corner solution they are
E
£
πh|Ch
0 = ±W
¤
=
1
16
bW2 > 0.
Note that the expected proﬁts are the same if the manipulator submits +x or −x, so he will be willing to
randomize with equal probability.
A.3.3 Market Makers
Market makers beliefs are consistent with the actions of the noise traders, the monopolist, and the manipu-
lator. Since prices are set competitively, no market maker has an incentive to change k.
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